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Demography and economics shape many aspects of the lives and decisions of
individuals as well as the structure and welfare of populations. An impor-
tant and persistent demographic shift that occupies much attention around
the world is the aging of many national populations, driven by changes in
the rates of birth, death or migration. An ongoing decline in death rates is a
common factor that drives aging in all industrialized nations and many of the
world's developing regions. Birth rates and migration also in°uence aging,
but their importance varies between countries. The 20th century was the ¯rst
period in history in which humans experienced a sustained decline in death
rates that resulted, in the now-rich nations, in a doubling of human life ex-
pectancy at birth and a 50 percent increase in the remaining life expectancy
of people at age 65. These changes expanded human life cycles in time and
precipitated changes in the pattern of individual lives and in relationships
between generations. Economic and demographic analyses of aging work at
one or both of these levels. For individuals and families, the stretching of
lives a®ects decisions about the level and timing of life cycle events such as
schooling, work, savings, and retirement. For populations, aging has meant
changes in °ows of labor and money, and challenges related to education,
annuities and pensions, insurance and health care. Analyses at both levels
require an understanding of how long people live, the di®erences between
individuals in life spans, and the rates at which these are changing. One di-
1mension of mortality that has been extensively studied is life expectancy, the
average span of life, which is the key statistic used to describe mortality and
health conditions. Many studies have examined trends and forecasts of life
expectancy, while others have examined the e®ect of inequalities in wealth,
income, or education on health by studying di®erences in life expectancy
between groups that di®er in these characteristics.
This paper focuses on a second dimension of mortality, the variation in
lifespan between individuals and groups of individuals. We begin by asking
whether the length of life should be measured starting at birth or at some
later age. To answer this question we ¯rst show that in today's industrialized
countries childhood mortality is so low that we should focus on di®erences
in the length of adult life. To measure such di®erences, we de¯ne the age at
adult death and its variance, following Edwards and Tuljapurkar (2005). This
variance and aggregate life expectancy describe two distinct dimensions of
the distribution of life (and death) within populations. Next we present and
discuss historical trends in this variance, and compare trends across countries.
We then discuss the relationship between the pattern of adult death and
socioeconomic inequalities, in factors such as education and income, using
data from the US. Finally we examine the e®ect of variance in adult death
on simple economic measures in an overlapping generations setting.
2Death and Inequality
The modern rise in the length of life began about the time of the Industrial
Revolution and has continued ever since. Figure 1 illustrates the gains in life
expectancy at birth (e0) and at age 65 (e65) using data for Sweden from 1950
to 2000. Over that period e0 increased by about 12% and e65 by about 33%.
Mortality here is measured using period death rates observed in particular
calendar years; for each year, we compute quantities such as the average age
at death that describe a hypothetical cohort of individuals who experience
those over their lives. The higher proportional increase in e65 compared to e0
resulted from two factors. First, mortality in Sweden at young ages is now so
low that further reductions have relatively little leverage on life expectancy.
Second, reductions in mortality are, over time, occurring at older ages than
in the past. To gain further insight into these two factors we next examine
the probability distribution of the age at death.
The age pattern of mortality is described by an age-speci¯c mortality rate
¹(a) and the probability of living to at least age a is the survivorship l(a).
The probability that an individual dies at age a is described by the density
Á(a) = ¹(a)l(a). Figure 2 displays this density for Sweden in 1950 and in
2000. The risk of dying at young ages is concentrated in the ¯rst year of
life and has fallen steadily in the past 50 years. For example, in Sweden in
2000 less than 0.4% of deaths in the period life table occur at ages under 10
yrs. Beyond age 10, death is increasingly likely with over 85% of all deaths
3concentrated in a range of 20 years or so around a sharply de¯ned modal age
that is slightly higher than the life expectancy at birth. It is the variation
in this age range that describes the bulk of variation in \adult" death. An
individual who survives her ¯rst year of life is most likely to die as an adult
(over age 10) and di®erences between individual ages at death are largely
di®erences in the age of adult death.
Based on these observations, Edwards and Tuljapurkar (2005) de¯ne adult
death as death occurring after age 10. The probability distribution of the age
of adult death is derived from Á(a) in Figure 2 as the conditional distribution
given that death occurs after age 10. The shape of the conditional distribu-
tion is the same as that of Á. The variance of this conditional distribution
is de¯ned to be the variance in the age at adult death, denoted here by S2
10.
The value of S10 measures the dispersion in age at adult death. We cannot
measure this dispersion by the variance of the full distribution Á, because
the size of that variance is always strongly a®ected by the infant mortality
peak even when infant mortality is as small as it is in Fig. 2. Our choice
of 10 years is somewhat arbitrary but any age near the minimum of the full
distribution (see Figure 2) serves equally well. Figure 3 shows the e®ect of
using di®erent cuto® ages of 10 and 20 years on the standard deviation of
the age at adult death, using data for Sweden from 1951 to 2000. The two
curves shown track each other very closely and the values are very close over
the period.
The measure S10 describes the extent of inequality in the age at death.
4Why do we call this an inequality? There is considerable current interest in
the role of socioeconomic inequalities as determinants of inequalities in health
outcomes (e.g., Marmot 2005). Health is not easily de¯ned or measured but
mortality risk is widely used as an indicator of health and age at death
is of course a primary health outcome variable. In this context our S10 is
an appropriate measure of inequality in health outcomes. We note that a
di®erent way of describing inequality in adult death is to use percentiles of
the death distribution, as suggested by Victor Fuchs in his comments on
this paper. Such percentiles have previously been used by Wilmoth and
Horiuchi (1999) in a discussion of the possible compression of age at death.
We believe that S10 is in many ways a natural measure and is particularly
useful in thinking about the nature of risk, but percentiles can provide useful
additional insights.
The distribution of adult deaths is the large concentrated mass of the dis-
tribution in Figure 2. A rough approximation to the distribution is a normal
centered on the modal age at death with a standard deviation of S10 and we
use this approximation later in this paper. It is worth comparing the actual
distributions in Figure 2, or their normal approximations, to two stylized
distributions of death that have been used by economists. The ¯rst, dating
back to early work (Yaari 1955, Blanchard 1985) on overlapping generation
models, assumes that the probability of death is independent of age (Figure
4a), and leads to a most unrealistic exponential distribution of the age at
death. The second (Futagami and Nakajima 2001) assumes that all adults
5dies at the same age (Figure 4b). Our discussion suggests that a more real-
istic treatment of the age distribution of human deaths should use e0, which
is close to the modal age of adult death, as a measure of location and S10 as
a measure of dispersion.
Historical Inequality in Adult Death
Historical changes have increased the average age at death e0 in most coun-
tries. We now examine the corresponding historical change in the dispersion
in adult death measured by S10. The nature of change in S10 will tell us
whether mortality improvement means that both the average and the vari-
ance in adult age at death change together. In other words, are we compress-
ing inequality in age at adult death while also delaying death?
Figure 5 plots S10 versus life expectancy e0 for Sweden from 1900 to
1950. Time turns out to run from left to right across the plot. There were
°uctuations in both e0 and S10 but the overall negative correlation between
them was very high. In this period S10 fell to 50% of its 1951 value, decreasing
at 0.22 years per calendar year, whereas e0 grew to nearly 150% of its value
in 1951, increasing at 0.4 years per calendar year. In the years 1951 to 2000,
as shown in Figure 6, the negative correlation between S10 and e0 weakened
somewhat. Life expectancy continued to increase, albeit at a slower pace, at
about 0.2 years per calendar year. But S10 decreased much more slowly and
with signi¯cant °uctuation, at about 0.022 years per calendar year.
6In the ¯rst half of the 20th century, mortality declines clearly acted as a
\rising tide" that reduced inequality in age at adult death across the popu-
lation as a whole. In terms of the distribution of age at death (recall Figure
2) the mass of adult deaths moved to later ages while also being compressed.
In the second half of the 20th century, progress against mortality continued,
so the mass of deaths continued its march to older ages, but the compres-
sion of inequality slowed considerably. It is important to recognize that the
compression of mortality inequality contains an important message about
the extent of variation in mortality between individuals. There is great in-
terest in the e®ect of risk factors as predictors of individual mortality risk,
and the notion that individual behavior can strongly a®ect age at death is
widespread. Indeed the argument is often made that the distribution of risk
factors shapes the distribution of deaths (e.g., Mokdad et al. 2004). His-
tory tells us, however, that the total variance in adult death, which includes
the contributions of all risk factors, has declined substantially over time and
indeed continues to do so. We return to the predictive value of risk factors
later in this paper.
International Trends and the Future
How do these historical patterns for Sweden compare with what has happened
in other countries? The slowdown in the decline of S10 in Sweden since about
1960, seen in Figs. 5 and 6, is partially mirrored across the industrialized
world. A comprehensive and recent comparison across all OECD countries
7has been published by the OECD (2007). We focus on a subset of the OECD
countries from 1960 onwards as shown in Figure 7, which is redrawn from
the data used by Edwards and Tuljapurkar (2005). The strikingly highest
and steadiest curve in the plot is for the US, which had the highest level of
mortality inequality among these countries (and indeed across the industri-
alized world) over the entire period. Canada displayed a level of inequality
and a lack of trend similar to the US from 1960 to 1980 but after that S10 in
Canada has fallen signi¯cantly. The sharp contrast between recent trends in
S10 in these two countries is plausibly due to the widespread availability of
national health services in Canada after 1980. For the entire period shown
in Figure 7, there is one country whose S10 is just below that for the US and
shows the same absence of overall trend. That country is France. Given the
widespread public commentary in each country that they are least likely to
resemble each other, this is quite a surprise.
The UK, Sweden and Denmark started out with similar levels of inequal-
ity in 1960. Sweden and the UK changed little through the 1980s, but Swe-
den's S10 then declined whereas the UK had a modest increase. Denmark is
another surprise, with an increase in S10 through the 1980s and higher in-
equality at the end of the period than in had in 1960. Japan, as is often the
case in such comparisons, is strikingly distinctive, with a notable decrease
in inequality from 1960 (when Japan and the US had similar levels of S10)
till 1990 (when Japan and Sweden were tied with the lowest inequality). In
the most recent decade, Japan's S10 has actually increased. Victor Fuchs
8(in his comments on this paper) has examined this recent trend in Japan
using percentiles of the distribution of age at death. To see why percentiles
matter, look again at Figure 2. The distribution of age at death around
the mode has a left skew, as is typical of most human history, which means
that much of the inequality we discuss here is driven by early deaths. But
for recent years in Japan, Fuchs ¯nds that the probability of dying at ages
above the mode (use Figure 2 as a guide) has increased relative to the past,
thus changing the skewness of the distribution. As a result the inequality in
age at death in Japan may be increasing because there is a higher chance of
living to old ages past the mode. This explanation marches with the known
fact that the number of centenarians in Japan is increasing very rapidly with
time (Robine, Saito and Jagger 2003).
Bongaarts (2007) recently proposed an interesting model of mortality
change to be used in making forecasts. He argues that life expectancy simply
increases at some steady rate per year and that the shape of the distribution
of adult deaths, based on Á(a), does not change with time for deaths over
age 25 yrs. In his view the mass of adult deaths, as shown in our Fig. 2,
simply translates to later ages at some steady rate, but with the dispersion of
the mass constant. He arrived at his model using rather di®erent arguments
about the nature of senescence and so our historical analysis provides a test
of his assumptions. It is clear from Fig. 7 that his approximation is plausible
for trends in the US since 1960; it may also be plausible for some other but
not all countries in recent decades. His model would clearly not be correct
9as a description of historical change prior to 1960.
The Sources of Variance in Adult Death
We turn now to a di®erent question: what causes di®erences in mortality
within a country between groups that are distinguished by characteristics
such as income, education, race or other factors that we expect to in°u-
ence mortality risk? This question has become particularly important in
recent discussions about the relationships between mortality and socioeco-
nomic inequality measured in various ways (Mokdad et al. 2004, Marmot
2005). Typically, analyses of such relationships have focused on the e®ect of
a particular risk factor on either life expectancy or relative mortality rates.
Controlling for di®erences in other likely risk factors, a successful analysis
detects a di®erence in the e0 corresponding to di®erences in the particular
factor in question. Such studies measure what we call the variance between
groups that are distinguished by particular explanatory factors. But we have
found that such relationships can be studied in a di®erent and more infor-
mative way by asking how socioeconomic factors a®ect the variance of adult
age at death both between groups and within groups.
We consider a decomposition of a population into subgroups based on
di®erences in socioeconomic variables, and use results from Edwards and
Tuljapurkar (2005). They considered the e®ects of education and income,
both factors that are well known to a®ect mortality rates and average age at
10death, as well as of sex, race, and certain causes of death. We focus on the
e®ects of education, which is a much more stable socioeconomic measure for
adults than is income. Data were taken from the US National Longitudinal
Mortality Study, a panel study of over half a million individuals who were
interviewed around 1980 and then tracked for nine years. Socioeconomic data
were observed only at the beginning of the period, and the analysis used only
mortality in the ¯rst year of the sample. To keep comparisons simple, the
analysis considered only two socioeconomic strata, with individuals sorted
according to whether they are high school graduates, roughly two-thirds of
the sample. Life tables were constructed for both sexes combined in each
group, and smoothed distributions of ages at death were constructed and
used to estimate conditional means and variances.
Figure 8 (redrawn using the data from Edwards and Tuljapurkar 2005)
plots distributions of age at adult death by educational status. The plot lists
for each group the values of the conditional mean age at death M10 and the
within-group standard deviation S10. Clearly, adults in the lower stratum not
only have shorter average life spans, but also are subject to greater variability.
As adults, high school graduates live an average of 5 years longer than their
less educated counterparts, while enjoying a standard deviation that is 2 years
lower. But the variance between these groups (approximately the square of
the di®erence in M10, so ' 25) is an order of magnitude smaller than the
variance within groups (the average of the variances, so ' 225). This huge
di®erence re°ects the considerable overlap between the two distributions in
11Figure 8. Even if everyone in the United States had a high school diploma,
S10 would remain fairly high, at 14.6, which is only a year lower than the value
for the US as a whole. Clearly education matters, but it matters more to
averages and rather less to inequality, and thus matters less to the predictive
power of education about the age of death. A similar result is found when
looking at age at death as a function of household income (Edwards and
Tuljapurkar 2005).
These reults lead to broad conclusions about analytical strategies for fu-
ture research, and about policy conclusions from existing research. The an-
alytical strategy used to study the e®ects of socioeconomic inequality needs
to focus on mortality inequality and not just on average outcomes. For ex-
ample, it would be useful to search for risk factors that best separate groups,
i.e., that maximize the ratio of between-group variance to within-group vari-
ance in adult age at death. It would be useful to ask whether the roughly
constant inequality in age at death in the US can be explained by changes in
socioeconomic inequality. In other countries where S10 has fallen over time,
we should ask whether the e®ect of mortality decline has been to reduce the
within-group variances for all groups, or just the variances within particular
groups. In terms of policy, the results show clearly that reducing some kinds
of socioeconomic inequality will have little or no e®ect on inequality in age
at death.
12Economic Theory and Variance in Adult Death
Our variance S10 is simply the dispersion of the random age at death, call
it T, across adult individuals in a population. We can approximate the
distribution of adult deaths by a normal distribution around the modal age
at death, call it ¹, with a standard deviation ¾ = S10. This approximation
undershoots the true left-skewed distribution at ages below ¹ and overshoots
the true distribution at ages much over ¹, but it is reasonable for seeing how
variance in T a®ects lifetime income, consumption and utility.
Suppose that wages are ¯xed at some value W and an individual works
starting at some age as (upon leaving school or college, say) until the earlier
of death or retirement at age ar. For a given interest rate r, expected lifetime
earnings are
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Here E indicates an expectation over the distribution of age at death T, which
we take to be a normal distribution as above. The exact expressions here are
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This is sensible: when retirement occurs at an age well below the modal
age at death ¹, uncertainty in death has little e®ect on lifetime income. As
13age at retirement increases towards ¹, the dispersion ¾ in T translates into







For an interest rate of 0.03, and ¾ ' 14, which is typical of industrialized
countries, the multiplier is 0.42; in developing countries with ¾ ' 25, the
multiplier is 1. So the e®ect of increasing ¹ by a year is about the same
as decreasing ¾ by half a year in industrialized countries and by a year in
developing countries.
Lifetime consumption also depends on T. In simple overlapping genera-
tions models (Blanchard 1985) with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
utility, the optimal consumption at age x is a function
c(x) = c0 e
kx; where k = (r ¡ µ)=°;
where r is interest rate, µ is the discount rate, and ° is the coe±cient of risk





So inequality in T translates into inequality in lifetime consumption. This
fact suggests that it would be useful to incorporate uncertainty in T into
analyses of the bene¯ts of increasing lifespan.
14Lifetime utility depends on consumption in these settings, and in the
CRRA model, utility at age x is proportional to c(x)(1¡°)=(1¡°). Expected
lifetime utility averages over the variation in T and thus also depends on
¾. The e®ect of ¾ on lifetime consumption depends on the factor k but the
e®ect on lifetime utility depends on the product k(1¡°), being modi¯ed by
the level of risk aversion. Li (2005) has explored these connections in more
detail by studying the equilibrium of a simple closed economy model with
adult deaths distributed normally as above.
Conclusion
This paper has shown that the variance in age at adult death is a useful
and important dimension of mortality change. Trends in this variance are
informative about the speed and the age-pattern of mortality change. The
decomposition of this variance with respect to risk factors provides useful in-
sights into the explanatory power of di®erent factors that are correlated with
mortality. Historical and economic analyses can bene¯t from an examination
of variance in age at death in addition to the traditionally important study
of life expectancy.
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Figure Legends
Figure 1. Gains in period life expectancy between 1950 and 2000 at birth
(e0, solid) and at age 65 (e65, dashes) for Sweden, both sexes combined.
Figure 2. Probability distribution of age at death in 1950 (solid) and 2000
(dashed) for Sweden, both sexes combined.
Figure 3. The e®ect of de¯ning \adult" death as deaths over age 10 or
20. The solid line shows S10 and the dashed line shows S20, as de¯ned in the
text, for Sweden from 1950 to 2000, both sexes combined.
Figure 4. Stylized probability distributions of age at death. a) Age-
independent probability of death, and b) all deaths at one age.
Figure 5. Standard deviation S10 in adult age at death plotted against life
expectancy at birth e0 from 1900 to 1950 for Sweden, both sexes combined.
Figure 6. Standard deviation S10 in adult age at death plotted against life
expectancy at birth e0 from 1951 to 2000 for Sweden, both sexes combined.
Figure 7. Conditional standard deviations in the age at death, S10, in
seven high-income countries since 1960. Data for both sexes combined are
taken from the Human Mortality Database.
16Figure 8. Distributions of ages at death by educational group in the
United States in 1981. Data are constructed from a life table derived from
deaths observed in the ¯rst year of the US National Longitudinal Mortality
Study. Education was observed at the beginning of the period. M10 is the
mean age at death above age 10, equal to e10+10. Data have been smoothed
using a kernel density estimator.
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High School Graduate, M
10 = 78.0, S
10 = 14.6
Less than High School, M
10 = 72.9, S
10 = 16.7